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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
“Treason” is a damning charge.  Rhetorically, and 
legally.  It was long considered the most serious of offenses, 
even more serious than murder.  Consider, for example, that 
in the Inferno, Dante places the murderers in the Seventh Circle 
of Hell.1  But the traitors occupy the Ninth and lowest Circle.2  
                                                 
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy.  I am 
grateful to Nadine Hammoud, Zeina Rammal, Samia Abbas, and 
Patrina Bergamo for their research and editorial assistance, and to 
the Lincoln Memorial University Law Review for inviting me to 
participate in this Symposium. 
1 See DANTE ALIGHIERI, INFERNO  95-99 (Mark Musa, ed. & trans., 
Indiana Critical Ed. 1995) (1308). 
2 Id. at 230-35.  Here, in Canto XXXIII, Dante travels through 
Antenora, where he encounters famous traitors.  At one point, he 
sees two heads frozen inside of a single hole, with the head on top 
gnawing on the brain of the lower head.  Id. at 233.  See also Paul G. 
Chevigny, From Betrayal to Violence: Dante’s Inferno and the Social 
Construction of Crime, 26 L. & SOC. INQUIRY 787, 808-13 (2001) 
(discussing Dante’s treatment of political crimes of betrayal). 
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Blackstone labeled treason the worst of offenses,3 and other 
authorities have followed that notion.4  But “treason” is 
precisely how many government officials and political leaders 
described Edward Snowden’s disclosure of sensitive national 
security information.5  Senator Dianne Feinstein, then-chair of 
the Senate Intelligence Committee, said Snowden committed 
“an act of treason.”6  House Intelligence Committee chair Mike 
Rogers of Michigan had similar words: “That is what we call a 
traitor in this country.  He has traded something of value for 
his own personal gain that jeopardizes the national security of 
the United States.  We call that treason.”7  Former House 
Speaker Newt Gingrich said on NBC’s Meet the Press about 
Snowden: “[t]his was treason.”8  And Richard Clarke, former 
White House counter-terrorism advisor and appointed 
                                                 
3 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *75. 
4 See, e.g., Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125 (1807) (opinion 
of Marshall, C.J.) (remarking that “there is no crime which can more 
excite and agitate the passions of men than treason”); Stephan v. 
United States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 1943) (observing that 
“[t]reason is the most serious offense that may be committed against 
the United States”); Erin Creegan, National Security Crime, 3 HARV. 
NAT’L. SEC. J. 373, 376 (2012) (calling treason “the most serious of all 
offenses against the nation”). 
5 The Snowden affair is, of course, the subject of this symposium and 
the basic facts are likely well-known to most readers.  For a good 
description of the controversy, though, see Bryan Burrough, et al., 
The Snowden Saga: A Shadowland of Secrets and Light, VANITY FAIR, 
available at 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/politics/2014/05/edward-
snowden-politics-interview (May 2014).   The Snowden affair was 
also the subject of a recently released documentary.  See CITIZENFOUR 
(Praxis Films 2014). 
6 See Jeremy Herb & Justin Sink, Sen. Feinstein calls Snowden’s NSA 
leaks an ‘act of treason,’ THE HILL (June 10, 2013, 10:19 PM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/defense/304573-sen-feinstein-snowdens-
leaks-are-treason. 
7 See Laura Barron-Lopez, Rogers says Snowden committed treason, THE 
HILL (Dec. 22, 2013, 11:15 AM), 
http://thehill.com/policy/technology/193832-rep-rogers-says-
snowden-committed-treason.  
8 See Transcript, Meet the Press, NBC NEWS (June 1, 2014), available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/meet-the-press/meet-press-transcript-
june-1-2014-n121571 (remarks of Newt Gingrich). 
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member of President Barack Obama’s expert panel on the 
National Security Agency, said, “What Mr. Snowden did is 
treason, was high crimes.”9 
The fervor to brand Edward Snowden a traitor and 
convict him of treason is an understandable political response 
to his conduct.  Perhaps “treason” is simply convenient 
shorthand for describing serious criminal conduct involving 
an intentional breach of national security, not meant to 
describe the actual legal status of the conduct.  An epithet, but 
not a serious legal claim.10  But even if understandable, it 
nevertheless reflects potential shortcomings in the public 
understanding – and apparently, the understanding of our 
political leaders, in particular – about the law of American 
treason.   
This, too, is understandable.  Treason has been called 
one of the great forgotten clauses of the Constitution.11  
Despite its pedigree in our law, treason has received relatively 
little academic attention.  J. Willard Hurst’s collection of essays 
on treason remains the leading academic treatment of the 
subject,12 but only recently – over the past decade since the 
                                                 
9 Brian Ross & Lee Ferran, White House NSA Panel Member: Edward 
Snowden’s Leaks Still ‘Treasonous,’ ABCNEWS (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/white-house-nsa-panel-member-
snowdens-leaks-treasonous/story?id=21277856.  
10 See Kristen E. Eichensehr, Treason in the Age of Terrorism: An 
Explanation and Evaluation of Treason’s Return in Democratic States, 42 
VAND. J. TRANSNT’L L. 1443 (2009) (“Treason is both an ancient crime 
and a popular epithet”). 
 Or, perhaps, the rhetoric of treason can even fall into the 
category of joke-making.  During the 2015 Academy Awards 
broadcast, host Neil Patrick Harris joked, after Citizenfour had 
received the Academy Award for Best Documentary Feature, that 
Snowden “could not be here tonight for some treason.”  See THR 
Staff, Edward Snowden: I Laughed at Neil Patrick Harris’ Treason Joke, 
THE HOLLYWOOD REPORTER (Feb. 23, 2015, 12:44 PM), 
http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/edward-snowden-i-
laughed-at-777125. 
11 See Carlton F.W. Lawson, The Forgotten Constitutional Law of 
Treason and the Enemy Combatant Problem, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 863, 865 
(2006). 
12 See J. WILLARD HURST, THE LAW OF TREASON IN THE UNITED STATES: 
COLLECTED ESSAYS (1971).  See also Willard Hurst, Treason in the 
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September 11 attacks – has the Treason Clause begun to 
receive greater attention from contemporary scholars.13  
Professor George Fletcher lamented many years ago that 
treason is no longer part of a law school course on criminal 
law.14  The law of American treason thus remains 
underdeveloped, incomplete, and lousy with gaps.  But that 
might actually be a good thing.  A more well-developed 
treason law would likely require that treason be far more 
common.  Yet treason prosecutions have been sufficiently rare 
in our history that relatively few opportunities have arisen for 
courts and lawyers to adequately answer the many questions 
that could arise from an accusation of, and prosecution for, 
treason.   
Treason was a subject of some interest in the early 
years of the Republic – Benedict Arnold is perhaps our most 
famous traitor, though his betrayal at West Point occurred 
before the Constitution was drafted,15 and the treason trial of 
Aaron Burr perhaps the most prominent one of its kind during 
the era, produced some early Supreme Court precedent on the 
meaning of American treason law.16  Quite naturally, treason 
                                                                                                       
United States, 58 HARV. L. REV. 226 & 395 (1945) (explaining law of 
treason in essays that would later form Hurst’s book on treason). 
13 See, e.g., Lawson, supra note 11; Eichensehr, supra note 10; Paul T. 
Crane, Did the Court Kill the Treason Charge?: Reassessing Cramer v. 
United States and Its Significance, 36 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 635 (2009); 
Henry Mark Holzer, Why Not Call It Treason?: From Korea to 
Afghanistan, 29 S.U. L. REV. 181 (2002); Suzanne Kelly Babb, Fear and 
Loathing in America: Application of Treason Law in Times of National 
Crisis and the Case of John Walker Lindh, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1721 (2003); 
George P. Fletcher, Ambivalence About Treason, 82 N.C. L. REV. 1611 
(2004).  For a collection of the scholarship that discusses treason 
history, see Lawson, supra note 11, at 866 n.7.   
14 See George P. Fletcher, The Case for Treason, 41 MD. L. REV. 193, 194 
(1982). 
15 For an excellent account of General Washington’s response to the 
Arnold affair, in a chapter appropriately entitled “Treason,” see 
JAMES THOMAS FLEXNER, WASHINGTON: THE INDISPENSABLE MAN 141-
48 (1974).   
16 See Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75 (1807).  For an excellent 
account of the Burr trial, see R. KENT NEWMYER, THE TREASON TRIAL 
OF AARON BURR: LAW, POLITICS, AND THE CHARACTER WARS OF THE 
NEW NATION (2012). 
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was also a subject of debate during the Civil War period.17 But 
it was not until World War II that treason prosecutions 
became prominent again.  The 1940s saw a substantial number 
of treason prosecutions.18  Then there was the infamous 
incident involving Jane Fonda’s embrace of the North 
Vietnamese, which led to public branding of her as a traitor 
and the unflattering nickname of “Hanoi Jane.”19  Finally, it 
was in the post-September 11 world and the American effort 
to grapple with the problem of its own citizens joining forces 
with international terrorists that treason reemerged as a more 
serious prosecutorial option for the federal government. 
John Walker Lindh offers an example.  Though he 
traveled to the Middle East to study Arabic, Lindh later 
trained with a terrorist group and crossed from Pakistan into 
Afghanistan and joined a group of fighters that were funded 
by Osama bin Laden.20  The group sent him to fight with the 
Taliban against the Northern Alliance.21  He eventually 
surrendered to the Northern Alliance, and was recaptured 
after being temporarily freed during an armed attack by 
Taliban detainees upon a CIA operative who had been 
interviewing Lindh.22  Lindh was indicted and eventually 
pleaded guilty to charges of providing services to the Taliban 
and carrying an explosive device during commission of a 
felony.23  He is serving a twenty-year sentence in federal 
prison today.   And Yasser Esam Hamdi, a native of Louisiana, 
rather than being prosecuted in a civilian American court was 
instead detained on a Naval brig and never charged by the 
                                                 
17 See JONATHAN W. WHITE, ABRAHAM LINCOLN AND TREASON IN THE 
CIVIL WAR (2011). 
18 See Crane, supra note 13, at 638-39, 677-78. 
19 See Holzer, supra note 13, at 210-13.  Unlike Holzer, Fletcher does 
not see Fonda’s conduct as treasonous.  See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 
200. 
20 See Indictment, United States v. Lindh, No. 02-37a (E.D. Va. Feb. 5, 
2002). 
21 Id. 
22 Id.  
23 Id.  Some have argued that the Government should have charged 
Lindh with treason.  See, e.g., Holzer, supra note 13, at 220-21; 
Douglas W. Kmiec, Try Lindh for Treason, It’s Not Too Late, National 
Review Online, (posted Feb. 12, 2002). 
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Department of Justice with a crime.24  His case eventually 
went to the Supreme Court, which held that the President 
enjoyed the power to detain Hamdi as an enemy combatant, 
but that he was entitled to some process to challenge his 
detention.25  But it was Justice Scalia’s dissent in Hamdi that 
invoked treason.  Scalia, joined by Justice Stevens, argued that 
where an American citizen is captured fighting for the enemy, 
the government has two options: suspend the writ of habeas 
corpus, or try him for treason or some other crime.26  In 
Hamdi’s case, the Government did neither. 
Finally, in 2006, the Government obtained its first 
treason indictment since World War II, when it charged Adam 
Gadahn with treason after Gadahn appeared in al Qaeda 
videos.27  In them, he appeared with bin Laden and Ayman al-
Zawahiri, praised the September 11 attacks and encouraged al 
Qaeda to use its capability to attack the United States again.28   
Gadahn was never captured and tried; rather, he was killed in 
January 2015 during a counterterrorism operation.29 
Perhaps treason has fallen out of favor with federal 
prosecutors because of the enhanced evidentiary requirements 
that necessarily come with a treason prosecution.  Perhaps it is 
because other statutes exist that reach the same types of 
conduct without the burdens that come with the definition of 
treason – material support for terrorism, rebellion or 
insurrection, seditious conspiracy, advocating overthrow of 
the government, and recruiting others for service in armed 
hostility against the United States all come to mind.  Perhaps it 
                                                 
24 Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
25 Id. at 524, 533. 
26 Id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
27 See First Superseding Indictment, United States v. Gadahn, SA CR 
05-254 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 11, 2006). 
28 Id. 
29 See Greg Botelho & Ralph Ellis, Adam Gadahn, American mouthpiece 
for al Qaeda, killed, CNN.COM, 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/04/23/world/adam-gadahn-al-qaeda/ 
(posted Apr. 23, 2015). For a brief discussion of the Gadahn case, and 
a suggestion that the Government used the wrong theory of treason 
with respect to Gadahn’s conduct, see Kristen Eichensehr, Treason’s 
Return, 116 YALE L.J. POCKET PART 229 (2007).  Crane’s article on 
Cramer also discusses the Gadahn case.  See Crane, supra note 13, at 
636. 
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is some combination of these.30  Perhaps, as George Fletcher 
has argued, the decline of treason has less to do with proof of 
the elements and more to do with changing attitudes toward 
crime and criminal law.31  The feudal bases of treason are 
simply inconsistent with the liberal version of the criminal law 
that prevails today, a criminal law that prefers “systematic and 
scientific control of violence” to the symbolism of ancient 
treason law.32  But perhaps, in some cases at least, the trouble 
is not with proving the traitor’s actions but, rather, his intent.  
Intention, Hurst observed, is “at the heart” of treason.33  How 
does American treason law apply to one who communicates 
information that can be, and in fact is, both helpful and readily 
available to the enemy, or commits an overt act that in fact 
assists the enemy, but who does not simultaneously 
specifically intend to betray the United States?  American 
criminal law has long valued the imposition of mens rea, both 
as a check on the power of the state and as a method for 
measuring culpability.34   And a charge as serious as treason 
most surely requires proof of some heightened state of moral 
culpability at the time of the alleged overt act. 
The Snowden case therefore presents a distinctly 
modern wrinkle in the application of treason law, one that is 
implicated by the popular cry of “treason” against Snowden.  
It raises the problem that one may aid and comfort the enemy 
without actually intending to do so as a way of betraying 
America.  Can we (should we) still call that treason?  That is 
the specific problem I want to explore.  To do that, I will 
describe the American law of treason by giving special 
attention to the provision for adhering to the enemy, giving 
them aid and comfort (what I will call Adherence Treason, to 
distinguish it from Levying War Treason) and the mental state 
that American treason law requires for a conviction on this 
ground.  My project, then, is to explain why it is the mens rea 
element of treason law that complicates that law’s application 
to Snowden’s case, and indeed in any case in which an 
                                                 
30 See Crane, supra note 13, at 680-93. 
31 See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 1628. 
32 Id. 
33 HURST, supra note 12, at 15. 
34 See JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW § 10.01, at 
117 (6th ed. 2012). 
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American has aided the enemy through an electronic 
communication. 
 
II. AMERICAN TREASON LAW AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
TREASON MENS REA 
 
Treason is the only crime that the federal Constitution 
explicitly defines.  “Treason against the United States,” the 
text says, 
 
shall consist only in levying war against them, 
or in adhering to their enemies, giving them aid 
and comfort.  No person shall be convicted of 
treason unless on the testimony of two 
witnesses to the same overt act, or on 
confession in open court.  The Congress shall 
have the power to declare the punishment of 
treason, but no attainder of treason shall work 
corruption of blood, or forfeiture except during 
the life of the person attained.35   
 
Congress has also codified treason as a federal crime, at 
section 2381 of Title 18.  But because the crime of treason is 
constitutionalized, Congress cannot alter or modify the 
definition of treason by ordinary legislation.  So Section 2381 
provides that: “Whoever, owing allegiance to the United 
States, levies war against them or adheres to their enemies, 
giving them aid and comfort within the United States or 
elsewhere, is guilty of treason and shall suffer death, or shall 
be imprisoned not less than five years and fined under this 
title not less than $10,000; and shall be incapable of holding 
any office under the United States.”36  As treason is punishable 
by death, Congress has enacted a set of procedures for capital 
treason prosecutions that is distinct from the procedures 
employed in typical capital murder prosecutions at the federal 
level.37   
                                                 
35 U.S. CONST. art. III, §3. 
36 18 U.S.C. §2381 (2012). 
37 In a capital treason prosecution, the list of statutory aggravating 
factors is shorter than for capital homicide prosecutions, 18 U.S.C. § 
3591(a) (2012), and the Government need not prove the specific 
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Notice the word “only” in the constitutional text: there 
are only two ways to commit treason – by levying war against 
the United States, or by giving aid and comfort to the enemy 
(which is how one adheres to the enemy).  This is a product of 
design.  The Framers of the Constitution explicitly desired a 
limited treason in America.38  The crime was meant to be 
narrow, more narrow even, than its chief English antecedent.  
The Statute of 25 Edward III, enacted in 1351, created seven 
basic categories of treason for purposes of English law:  
compassing or imagining the death of the king, or queen, or 
their eldest son and heir; violating the wife of the king or the 
wife of the king’s eldest son; levying war against the king in 
his realm; adhering to the king’s enemies in his realm, giving 
them aid and comfort in the realm or elsewhere; 
counterfeiting; killing the chancellor, the treasurer, or the 
king’s justices; murder of a master by a servant, a husband by 
a wife, or a prelate by a cleric (this was called “petty treason”; 
the other categories were “high treason”).39  This statute did 
away with the common law of treason in England and was 
greatly admired not only by English authorities,40 but also by 
American colonists and the founders, who drew upon its 
language in crafting colonial treason law and the 
constitutional definition.41  With the development of treason 
law in America in the aftermath of the Revolution, however, it 
became clear that certain forms of English treason would not 
apply here.42  Of course, many of the categories of English 
treason were predicated upon acts taken against the 
monarchy, and America would not be a monarchy.  
Americans could have adopted some of these provisions and 
                                                                                                       
statutory mental state factors related to death that are required in a 
capital homicide prosecution.  Compare 18 U.S.C. §3591(a)(1) with 18 
U.S.C.  §3591(a)(2)(A-D). 
38 See HURST, supra note 12, at 130. 
39 Statute of Treasons, 25 Edw. III, ch. 2 (1351). 
40 See EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS 
OF ENGLAND 2 (London, 5th ed. 1671). 
41 See HURST, supra note 12, at 130-40.  Curiously, as Hurst explains, 
the original draft of the Constitution did not contain a treason 
provision.  Id. at 129.  The Committee of Detail created and inserted 
the Treason Clause into the Constitution.  Id.  The Convention then 
fully discussed the new language on August 20, 1787.  Id. at 130. 
42 Id. at 106, 126. 
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simply made them acts against elected political leaders, but 
many of these notions were never considered. 
Moreover, the leading founder on treason, 
Pennsylvania’s James Wilson (who served on the Committee 
of Detail that drafted the Treason Clause), argued that 25 
Edward III was the chief basis for our treason law and that 
American treason should be interpreted in light of that 
statute.43  Other leading authorities agreed.44 Wilson remarked 
that the charge of treason was a dangerous charge, so it was 
important to limit the Government’s power to bring it, thus 
further explaining the narrowness of American treason under 
the Constitution.45  And Chief Justice Marshall, in narrowly 
construing the text of the Treason Clause in Ex Parte Bollman, 
said that “[a]s there is no crime which can more excite and 
agitate the passions of men than treason, no charge demands 
more from the tribunal before which it is made a deliberate 
and temperate inquiry.”46  The Constitution offers a limited 
notion of treason, Marshall wrote, “[t]o prevent the possibility 
of those calamities which result from the extension of treason 
to offenses of minor importance.”47  Constructive treasons, in 
particular, were viewed by the founding generation as a threat 
to political liberty, so the evolution of American treason law 
was careful to avoid these dangers.48  Hamilton, in responding 
                                                 
43 See HURST, supra note 12, at 135. 
44 Id. at 130-31. 
45 JAMES WILSON, 3 COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 1149-50 
(Mark David Hall & Kermit Hall, ed. 2007), available at 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/wilson-collected-works-of-james-
wilson-vol-2.  Wilson says, referring to Montesquieu’s observations, 
that treason “is indeterminate,” which “along is sufficient to make 
any government degenerate into arbitrary power.”  Id. at 1149.  He 
continues that in both monarchies and republics, treason law 
“furnishes an opportunity to unprincipled courtiers, and to 
demagogues equally unprincipled, to harass the independent citizen, 
and the faithful subject, by treasons, and by prosecutions for 
treasons, constructive, capricious, and oppressive.”  Id. 
46 Ex Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 125 (1807). 
47 Id. at 125-26. 
48 See Cramer v. United States, 325 U.S. 1 (1945) (discussing the 
negative view of constructive treasons among the founding 
generation).  See also Stephan v. United States, 133 F.2d 87, 90 (6th Cir. 
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to the complaint that the original Constitution contained no 
bill of rights, even included the Treason Clause among those 
constitutional provisions (beyond the structural ones) that 
offered protections to the individual against government 
action.49 
So the first principle we can derive from the definition 
of American treason – and one that would militate against a 
treason charge for someone like Snowden – is that it is 
deliberately narrow and does not embrace constructive or 
questionable treasons. 
The other thing worth noticing about the text’s 
definition of the crime is that it does not include an explicit 
mens rea term.  Or does it?  In some ways, this should be 
unsurprising.  The English Treasons Statute, 25 Edward III, 
did not contain familiar common law mens rea terminology.  
And still, by the time of the framing, mens rea was well-
known to the English courts, the English common law, and to 
colonial criminal law.50  Blackstone highlighted the state of 
mind that makes for treason noted in light of the English law, 
stating that “a bare intent to commit treason is many times 
actual treason: as imagining the death of the king, or 
conspiring to take away his crown.”51  Early treason case law 
referred to treasonous intention.52  And Justice Story spoke of 
“intention” and “treasonable purpose” while adjudicating a 
treason case in Rhode Island53 (though he offered his 
statement of the law with respect to levying war, rather than 
                                                                                                       
1943) (stating “[t]he Constitution has left no room for constructive 
treason”). 
49 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 511 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton 
Rossiter, ed., 1961). 
50 See Paul H. Robinson, A Brief History of Distinctions in Criminal 
Culpability, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 815 (1980).  See also WAYNE R. LAFAVE, 
CRIMINAL LAW §5.1(a), at 253 (5th ed. 2010) (noting that since about 
1600, common law judges defined crimes to contain some bad state 
of mind, and setting forth conventional common law mens rea 
terms). 
51 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *35. 
52 See United States v. Hoxie, 26 F. Cas. 397, 399 (C.C.D. Vt. 1808) (No 
15,407); United States v. Pryor, 27 F. Cas. 628, 630 (C.C.D. Pa. 1814) 
(No. 16,096). 
53 See Charge to the Grand Jury – Treason, 30 F. Cas. 1046, 1047 (C.C. 
D. R.I. 1842) (No. 18.275).   
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adhering to the enemy, and defined the treasonable purpose 
broadly).54  But none of these early authorities meaningfully 
explained the precise culpable mental state that the 
government must prove to establish treason. 
Despite the lack of clarity in the constitutional or 
statutory text as to the precise mens rea required for treason, it 
is generally agreed today that treason requires a specific intent 
to betray the United States.  Perhaps the most important 
treason case of the modern Supreme Court is Cramer v. United 
States,55 decided in 1945, and it is here where we first 
encounter the modern Court’s discussion of treason mens rea.   
In 1942, German submarines arrived at the coasts of 
Long Island and Florida.56  Four men exited each sub and 
buried their Nazi uniforms and then dressed as civilians.57  
They had trained at a sabotage school in Germany and were 
supposed to destroy American war infrastructure.58  Although 
all of the men had lived in the United States, all but one were 
German citizens. 59  They were eventually arrested and tried in 
military tribunals, which the Supreme Court validated in Ex 
parte Quirin.60  Cramer was born in Germany but was 
naturalized in the United States in 1936.61  He befriended 
Warner Thiel, who would become one of the aforementioned 
                                                 
54 See Lawson, supra note 11, at 911 (explaining Story’s view).  
Lawson also helpfully notes that an early Nevada statute, defining 
“levying war” treason for state law purposes, contained an explicit 
mens rea element: “when persons arise in insurrection with the 
intent to prevent, in general, by force and intimidation, the execution 
of statute in this state, or to force its repeal.”   Id. at 912 (citing NEV. 
REV. STAT. ANN. §196.020 (LexisNexis 2011)).  The statute includes, 
but does not define, adhering to the enemies of Nevada, giving them 
aid and comfort. 
55 325 U.S. 1 (1945).  Crane’s article offers a valuable history of the 
case, as well as of the Justice’s decision-making.  See generally Crane, 
supra note 13. 
56 See Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 21 (1942). 
57 Id. 
58 Id. 
59 Id. 
60 Id. at 48.  The Court held that Herbert Hans Haupt, one of the 
saboteurs, could be tried by military commission, rather than by 
civilian court for treason, even though he may have been an 
American citizen.  Id. at 38. 
61 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 3-4. 
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Nazi saboteurs.62  They were roommates and even engaged in 
a joint business venture.63  Responding to an anonymous note, 
Cramer went to Grand Central Station and met Thiel for 
drinks.64  They then met two more times and Thiel gave 
Cramer a money belt with $3,600 in it.65  Cramer kept a 
portion, set aside a portion in case Thiel needed it, and then 
put the rest in a safe deposit box.66  The FBI observed two of 
the meetings and arrested Cramer.67  Cramer was tried for 
treason, but said he lacked any treasonous intent and that his 
overt acts did not, on their face, manifest treason.68 
The Supreme Court held for Cramer.  In the course of 
doing so, the Court held that Congress could criminalize 
treasonous conduct under other statutory crimes without all of 
the procedural safeguards and limitations that attend treason 
itself.69  The Court also recognized that the overt act need not 
manifest treasonous intent.70  However, the overt act must 
actually give aid and comfort to the enemy.71  Cramer’s 
meetings with Thiel did not satisfy this standard.72   With 
respect to the mental element of the crime, the Court 
grounded treason mens rea in the textual requirement of 
“adherence” to the enemy.  “A citizen may favor the enemy 
and harbor sympathies or convictions disloyal to this 
country’s policy or interest, but so long as he commits no act 
of aid or comfort to the enemy, there is no treason,” Justice 
Jackson’s opinion declared.73 
  
                                                 
62 Id. at 4. 
63 Id. at 3-4. 
64 Id. at 5. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id.  
68 Id. at 31.  See also Crane, supra note 13, at 642 (describing Cramer’s 
claims before the Court).  According to Crane, Cramer claimed he 
did not possess treasonous intent because he was unaware of Thiel’s 
sabotage plans and met with Thiel simply as a friend.  Id. 
69 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 39-40. 
72 Id. 
73 Id. at 29. 
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On the other hand, a citizen may take actions, 
which do aid and comfort the enemy – making 
a speech critical of the government or opposing 
its measures, profiteering, striking in defense 
plants or essential work, and the hundred other 
things which impair our cohesion and diminish 
our strength – but if there is no adherence to the 
enemy in this, if there is no intent to betray, 
there is no treason.74   
 
The opinion elaborated upon treason mens rea by stating that 
“[q]uestions of intent in a treason case are even more 
complicated than in most criminal cases because of the 
peculiarity of the two different elements which together make 
the offense.”75  Treasonous intent cannot be shown through 
overt acts that are negligent or undesigned.76  Rather, “to make 
treason the defendant must not only intend the act, but he 
must intend to betray his country by means of the act.”77  
Treasonous intent can be inferred from conduct (including the 
relevant overt act itself), and one is deemed to intend the 
natural consequences of his actions.78  Here, however, the 
overt acts that the Government alleged were relatively trivial 
and did not themselves demonstrate treasonous intent.79  The 
Court also proved unwilling to find treason merely from an 
alleged treasonous intent in meeting with Thiel and another 
man named Edward Kerling (leader of the saboteurs), 
concluding that those acts did not actually have the effect of 
giving aid and comfort to the enemy.80  To conclude otherwise 
would “carry us back to constructive treasons.”81 
The first time that the Court ever affirmed a treason 
conviction was in Haupt v. United States.82  There, a father of 
one of the Nazi saboteurs and an American citizen – Hans 
                                                 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 31. 
76 Id. 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 31-32. 
79 Id. at 39-40. 
80 Id. at 40. 
81 Id. 
82 330 U.S. 631 (1947). 
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Max Haupt – was convicted of treason after giving his son 
(Herbert Hans Haupt) shelter, finding him a job, and giving 
him a car, all while knowing that his son was on the sabotage 
mission.83  Relying on the understanding of the overt act from 
Cramer, the Court held that these acts by Haupt were sufficient 
to actually give aid and comfort to the enemy.84  But the Court 
was also satisfied that Haupt possessed the requisite 
treasonous intent.85  Because Haupt knew of his son’s role, his 
aid to his son was not mere fatherly care.  It was done with the 
purpose of assisting his son in executing the German sabotage 
effort, not just of aiding his son as a son.86 
Following the lessons of Haupt and Cramer in the world 
of treason mens rea is Kawakita v. United States,87 another case 
arising out of actions amid World War II.  There, Tomoya 
Kawakita was a dual Japanese-American citizen who traveled 
to Japan to study at Meiji University.88 He renewed his 
passport in 1941 and took the oath of allegiance to America.89  
After school, and after registering with a family census 
registry in Japan (the Koseki), he later accepted a job with 
Oeyama Nickel Industry Company, that provided metals for 
the Japanese war effort.90  That company also employed 
American prisoners of war, and Kawakita was originally hired 
as an interpreter for communications between the Japanese 
and the American POWs.91  Kawakita’s treason charge was 
based on several different alleged overt acts, all of which 
involved severe maltreatment of the American POWs who 
                                                 
83 Id. at 632-33.  The son Herbert, of course, was among those 
convicted in Quirin.   
84 Id. at 636. 
85 Id. at 641-42. 
86 Id.  
87 343 U.S. 717 (1952). 
88 Id. at 720.   The threshold issue before the Supreme Court was 
whether Kawakita had renounced his American citizenship, thus 
exempting him from American treason law (because, if true, he 
would no longer owe allegiance to the United States).  Id. at 720-36.  
The Court rejected his claim, finding that he retained his dual 
citizenship.  Id. at 736.  This issue was the basis for Chief Justice 
Vinson’s dissent.  Id. at 745-46 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
89 Id. at 720. 
90 Id. 
91 Id. at 720-21. 
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worked at the company.92  He was tried for, and convicted of, 
treason when, after returning to the United States in 1946, a 
former American POW at the nickel company recognized 
Kawakita.93 
In affirming the conviction, Justice Douglas’s opinion 
for the Court explained that treason requires both giving aid 
and comfort to the enemy (the physical act required) and 
treasonous intent (the mens rea).  “One may think disloyal 
thoughts and have his heart on the side of the enemy.  Yet if he 
commits no act giving aid and comfort to the enemy, he is not 
guilty of treason,” Douglas wrote.94   “He may on the other 
hand commit acts which do give aid and comfort to the enemy 
and yet not be guilty of treason, as for example when he acts 
impulsively with no intent to betray.”95  The Court then 
explained that although the constitutional requirement of two 
witnesses applies to the physical overt act, the requirement 
does not extend to the mens rea.96  Rather, the Court said, the 
treasonous intent is inferred from conduct, from the overt acts, 
from the defendant’s statements about the war, and, as here, 
from the defendant’s professions of loyalty to the enemy 
nation.97   
Against this judicial backdrop, one can see why a 
treason prosecution against Edward Snowden would be a 
daunting task.  Snowden himself has publicly discussed the 
controversy (in Moscow, he has apparently built his own 
studio for conducting interviews).98  He has stated publicly 
                                                 
92 Id. at 737-39. 
93 Id. at 722. 
94 Id. at 736. 
95 Id. 
96 Id.  
97 Id. at 742-43. 
98 See Katrina vanden Heuvel & Stephen F. Cohen, Edward Snowden: 
A ‘Nation’ Interview, THE NATION (Oct. 28, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/186129/snowden-exile-
exclusive-interview#; James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the 
World, WIRED, Aug. 13, 2014, 
http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/; Alan 
Rusbridger & Ewen MacAskill, Edward Snowden interview – the edited 
transcript, THE GUARDIAN (July 18, 2014), 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/18/-sp-edward-
snowden-nsa-whistleblower-interview-transcript; Burrough, et al., 
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that his desire – his intent, if you will – was to alert the public 
to the scope of the American surveillance regime and to spur 
changes that would mitigate the surveillance state and hold 
public officials accountable.99  At no point does he state that it 
was his intention to aid the enemy in a war against America or 
to assist in planning an attack on the United States.  Now, of 
course, one might imagine that he would never publicly say 
that, even if it were true.  He is fully aware that he faces 
criminal charges and his statements seem naturally self-
serving.  But the point is that in the absence of such a 
confession, the prosecution would have to obtain other 
objective evidence of a desire to do just that, to adhere to the 
enemy by intending to betray the United States.  At least on 
the existing publicly-available evidence, that would be 
difficult indeed.  One need not agree with his actions in order 
to concede that there is insufficient evidence of his adherence 
to the enemy. 
Now, this is not to say that such evidence is impossible 
to discover.  In Kawakita, for example, the defendant made 
repeated statements about his desire to see America harmed.  
The statements included “It looks like MacArthur took a run-
out powder on you boys;” “The Japanese were a little superior 
to your American soldiers;” You Americans don’t have no 
chance.  We will win the war;” “Well, you guys needn’t be 
interested in when the war will be over because you won’t go 
back; you will stay here and work.  I will go back to the States 
because I am an American citizen;” “We will kill all you 
prisoners right here anyway, whether you win the war or lose 
it.  You will never get back to the States;” “I will be glad when 
all of the Americans is dead, and then I can go home and live 
happy.”100  If the Government could find such statements from 
Snowden – for example, that he hoped his disclosures would 
assist the enemy in perpetrating an attack, or that an attack on 
                                                                                                       
supra note 3.  See also Inside the Mind of Edward Snowden: Interview 
with Brian Williams, NBC NEWS, available at 
http://www.nbcnews.com/feature/edward-snowden-interview 
(aired May 29, 2014) (appearing on television for interview with 
NBC anchor Brian Williams). 
99 James Bamford, The Most Wanted Man in the World, WIRED, Aug. 13, 
2014, http://www.wired.com/2014/08/edward-snowden/. 
100 Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 743. 
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American interests, citizens, or military capabilities would 
teach us a valuable lesson about our national intelligence 
policies – then the case for treason would be measurably 
stronger.  But if Snowden’s desire was merely to alert the 
public to policies with which he disagreed, then, however 
misguided his tactics, that state of mind is an unlikely 
candidate for treasonous intent.101 
The “intent” of treason, then, seems a lot like motive.  
Indeed it is.  One may object that intent and motive are not the 
same.  And they are not.  But “intent,” as such, is a difficult 
word to understand in isolation.  The criminal law, 
particularly in the world of specific intent crimes, often makes 
motive relevant to proof of the offense.102  For example, one of 
the ways in which we distinguish a traditional specific-intent 
crime is to say that it is one that requires some special 
motivation for its commission (such as when we require “the 
intent to steal” or the “intent to kill”).103  Moreover, other 
crimes, such as hate crimes,104 are defined by the special 
motive that attends their commission.  Though the relevant act 
(e.g., causing bodily harm) may be performed intentionally or 
knowingly, it is a hate crime only when the act is performed 
with a particular bias motivation (e.g., because of the victim’s 
actual or perceived race or religion).105  Treason is 
substantially similar.  The Government must prove that the 
underlying overt act of providing aid and comfort to the 
enemy was done with a purpose to betray the United States 
and that purpose will often merge with the particular motive 
to see harm befall the country.  Still, courts have been reluctant 
to make too much of this overlap.  In two of the World War II 
treason prosecutions involving Americans who worked as 
radio broadcasters for the Germans – Chandler v. United 
States106 and Best v. United States107 – the defendants argued 
                                                 
101 This conclusion makes comments like those of Speaker Gingrich 
on Meet the Press all the more perplexing.  Gingrich said that 
Snowden “may be a patriotic traitor.  He may think, in his own 
mind, he did the right thing.  This was treason.”  See Meet the Press 
Transcript, supra note 8. 
102 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, §10.04[A][2], at 123. 
103 Id. at 138. 
104 See 18 U.S.C. § 249 (2012). 
105 Id. 
106 171 F.2d 921 (1st Cir. 1948). 
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that even though they intended to aid the German war effort 
and to create disunity and harm to American morale during 
the war, they had the special motive of rendering such aid 
because, they argued, it would be better for Americans by 
halting the pursuit of world domination by Jewish 
Communism.108  In each case, the First Circuit rejected the 
claim that this motive negated their intent to betray, because 
each defendant had the purpose of aiding the enemy.109  
Contrary to the First Circuit’s analysis,110 though, motive was 
actually not irrelevant in these cases.  The defendants had a 
treasonous motive – in addition to their purpose to render aid 
to Germany, they also were motivated directly by a desire to 
see Germany prevail in the war (which would necessarily 
mean an American defeat).111  It was simply mixed with yet 
another, somewhat more attenuated, motive.  In this sense, the 
mixed motives appear similar to the mixed motives of Hans 
Max Haupt.112  It is difficult to imagine a case in which the 
actor has the purpose of aiding the enemy in harming or 
defeating the United States, and yet he is acting solely with a 
motive that does not involve such harm or defeat but rather 
                                                                                                       
107 184 F.2d 131 (1st Cir. 1950). 
108 See Chandler, 171 F.2d at 925.  In each case, the defendant had 
served as a broadcaster for a German radio station.  See id. at 926; 
Best, 184 F.2d at 134.  The purpose of the broadcasts was to engage in 
“psychological warfare” to support the German war effort.  Chandler, 
171 F.2d at 926. The radio broadcasts were directed by the German 
Propaganda Ministry.  Id.  Broadcasting for the enemy was a popular 
basis for a treason charge during this period.  See also Gillars v. 
United States, 182 F.2d 962 (D.C. Cir. 1950) (involving broadcasting 
for the Germans); D’Aquino v. United States, 192 F.2d 338 (9th Cir. 
1951) (involving broadcasting for the Japanese). 
109 Chandler, 171 F.2d at 942-45; Best, 184 F.2d at 137-38. 
110 Chandler, 171 F.2d at 944 (holding that one who “trafficks with 
enemy agents” and gives them aid and comfort “is guilty of treason, 
whatever his motive.”). 
111 Id. at 944. 
112 See HURST, supra note 12, at 245 (arguing that Haupt holds that as 
long as one of the mixed motives is to betray the United States, the 
existence of a more pure motive is irrelevant).  Hurst argues that 
Chandler and Best are related, but distinct, on the question of motive.  
Id.  As indicated here, I find them more similar on this point than 
does Hurst. 
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would benefit America.  The specific “intent” of treason, and 
the bad motive that distinguishes it, simply converge.  
One may argue (the Government certainly did in 
Cramer)113 that the Court’s approach makes treason too 
difficult to prove.  Treason, one may contend, could be an 
especially powerful prosecutorial tool in times of national 
emergency or, as today, when grave dangers can be posed to 
national security as a result of advances in technology that 
make communicating with the enemy so easy.  The Court’s 
response to this, and one that arguably would fit the view of 
the Constitution’s Framers, was simple: treason is supposed to 
be hard to prove.114  Its difficulty helps to protect against 
politically vindictive prosecutions or the punishment of those 
who merely think disloyal thoughts.  Yet, as Haupt and 
Kawakita certainly show us, the task is not impossible.  Specific 
intent is not, and has never been, an insurmountable barrier to 
conviction, even in treason law.115  And in light of the ways in 
which electronic or digital communication can ease the 
provision of aid and comfort to America’s enemies, Adherence 
Treason could arguably form a larger share of federal 
prosecutorial energy and resources in the coming years.  After 
all, as the many stories of Americans who have lately sought 
to join forces with the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) 
demonstrate, many of those who have joined the cause of 
America’s enemies have not been shy about expressing their 
adherence to those that would harm us.116   
                                                 
113 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 45. 
114 See supra text accompanying notes 42-44. 
115 See Haupt, 330 U.S. at 641-42; Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 743. 
116 See, e.g., Ed Payne, More Americans volunteering to help ISIS, CNN 
(posted Mar. 5, 2015, 4:55 PM), available at 
http://www.cnn.com/2015/03/05/us/isis-us-arrests/; see also 
Gadahn Indictment, supra note 27.   
 Incidentally, whether ISIS (or, ISIL) currently constitutes an 
“enemy” of the United States for purposes of treason law is perhaps 
an open question, particularly in the absence of a specific 
authorization for the use of force against that group.  I leave that 
question for another time, and assume for the purposes of this article 
that ISIS could be an enemy for treason purposes (and I currently 
believe that is the better understanding of the issue).  Eichensehr 
offers an excellent discussion of this issue in her piece, though ISIS 
did not emerge until after her piece was published, and so her focus 
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III. ADHERENCE TREASON AS A SPECIES OF COMPLICITY? 
 
This “intent to betray” doctrine that I have discussed is 
now well-established.  It has been repeated in the Supreme 
Court, repeated by other courts, and repeated in the literature 
on treason.  More than anything, as I have explained, that is 
the principle that would foreclose treason liability for Edward 
Snowden.  And yet, established though it is, the derivation of 
this notion remains unclear.   
I asked earlier whether the text really does contain a 
mens rea element.  It does not, after all, do so in the 
conventional way.  There is no familiar, common law mens rea 
term (no “intentionally,” or “willfully,” for example), and 
especially no language common to the notion of specific intent 
(such as “with the intent to . . .”).  But it is nearly impossible to 
imagine treason as a strict liability offense and it has never 
been understood that way in American law.  The federal 
criminal law of mens rea has been inconsistent about its 
rationales for requiring mens rea where it is not codified in the 
statute.117  There is no federal common law of crimes (all 
federal criminal law is statutory) and federal courts have been 
reluctant at times to force common law notions onto 
congressional legislation or federal criminal law doctrine.118  
Still, federal criminal law has developed the following 
principle: absent evidence that Congress intended something 
to the contrary, and unless the offense falls into a category of 
public welfare regulations that would permit strict liability, 
courts presume Congress meant for some mens rea to apply to 
federal crimes.119  This is particularly true, the Court has said, 
                                                                                                       
is on other non-state actors.  See Eichensehr, supra note 10, at 1491-98, 
1505. 
117 Compare Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952) with 
United States v. Dotterweich, 320 U.S. 277 (1943); United States v. 
Balint, 258 U.S. 250 (1922).  See also United States v. X-Citement 
Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64 (1994) (describing the Court’s approach to 
mens rea in federal cases where mens rea terms are missing from 
statute). 
118 See United States v. Hudson & Goodwin, 11 U.S. 32 (1812). 
119 See Morissette, 342 U.S. at 252-53.  See also Staples v. United States, 
511 U.S. 600, 605 (1994) (stating the preference for requiring mens 
rea, and that congress must clearly intend for a criminal statute to 
dispense with mens rea). 
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where the crime is one against the state (like treason), the 
person, property, or public morals.120  So even in the absence 
of an explicit mens rea element, our natural inclination would 
be to interpret the Treason Clause to impose one.  There is no 
sound reason, then, to doubt Cramer’s explication (or that of 
earlier cases from lower courts) of the law of treason as 
requiring a culpable mental state.   
Cramer, though, understands the word “adhering” as 
necessarily embracing the mental element of intentional 
betrayal.  “Adherence to the enemy,” Justice Jackson said, is 
the “disloyal state of mind” that the Government must 
prove.121  This, presumably, is because one cannot adhere to the 
enemy by anything less than a conscious object to do so.  The 
modern dictionary definition of adhere recognizes such a 
connection between the adherent and the person who receives 
the adherence, as to “give support or maintain loyalty.”122  
And Samuel Johnson’s dictionary of 1755 defined adhere 
primarily as “sticking to,” or “holding together,” but also as 
“[t]o remain firmly fixed to a party, person, or opinion.”123  
There is, therefore, support in English usage for the Court’s 
understanding of the mental state that accompanies one’s 
adherence to the enemy.  Of course, one could argue that 
Cramer and Kawakita make too much of the specific intent to 
betray as a corollary of “adhering,” and that treason could be 
found with something less than specific intent to betray 
America.  For example, one might argue that the constitutional 
text stipulates only that one “adheres” to the enemy when he 
aids and comforts them.  Therefore, the argument goes, so 
long as he actually gives aid and comfort, it matters not 
whether he intends specifically to betray the United States or 
simply desires some firm connection to a different group or 
idea, nor would it matter whether he gives aid and comfort 
only knowingly (in the sense that he is aware that is aiding an 
enemy of the United States), or even recklessly (in the sense 
                                                 
120 Morrissette, 342 U.S. at 252-53. 
121 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 30. 
122 See MERRIAM-WEBSTER DICTIONARY 14 (10th ed. 2002). 
123 A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE: A DIGITAL EDITION OF 
THE 1755 CLASSIC BY SAMUEL JOHNSON 81 (1755) (Brandi Besalke, ed.), 
available at 
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that he is subjectively at fault for consciously choosing a 
course of conduct in which there is a substantial risk that he 
will aid and comfort the enemy).  In any of these scenarios, so 
long as he remains fixed to an enemy in some way, he is by 
definition adhering to the enemy and has committed treason 
as the Constitution describes it.  In this way, the law of treason 
still resists strict liability and maintains some substantial mens 
rea to accompany the relevant overt act, but is not what we 
would think of as a specific intent crime.  If we do not accept 
“adhering” as necessarily requiring the specific intent to 
betray, then this reading of the Treason Clause seems 
plausible. 
Hurst’s work on treason also reached the conclusion 
that a specific intent to betray is an element of treason, and 
cites early cases rejecting guilt for treason based on a lack of 
intent to betray, yet even Hurst acknowledges authority to the 
contrary.124  Hurst alludes only briefly to the disagreement in a 
footnote that compares the law of treason to the law of 
attempt, which requires the specific intent to carry out the 
target crime.125    Hurst is correct that this is the general 
approach to attempt mens rea.  But, for one thing, federal 
criminal law contains no general attempt statute, so there is no 
congressional enactment to which we can look to draw the 
comparison.  Also, Hurst appears to be describing Levying 
War Treason, not Adherence Treason.126  It is true that the 
specific intent would be the same for criminal liability under 
either theory, but because he discusses that specific intent as 
deriving from the natural betrayal of allegiance that would 
exist when levying war against one’s country, he does not 
consider, as Cramer does, whether the specific intent to betray 
constitutes a natural reading of the word “adhering.”127  
Indeed, he concedes that Cramer is ambiguous about the 
specific intent.128  Finally, if Hurst was looking for a criminal 
law analogue to bolster the requirement of a specific intent, 
attempt seems to be the wrong analogue to Adherence 
Treason because the giving of aid and comfort with the 
                                                 
124 See HURST, supra note 12, at 193-203. 
125 Id. 222-23 n.25. 
126 See id. at 193 (discussing “intent” in the context of levying war). 
127 See Cramer, 325 U.S. at 30. 
128 See HURST, supra note 12, at 193, 202. 
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requisite intent would complete the crime, thus taking it out of 
the law of attempts. 
I would suggest still another way of thinking about the 
Treason Clause, and why it requires this kind of “intent,” or 
purpose (or, as discussed previously, motive) to betray.  
Treason has been described as an “outlier” in criminal law, at 
least in the sense that it does not retain the structure of 
modern criminal law.129  If that is true, then there is little 
reason to think it should employ the general parts of crime 
(actus reus, mens rea, causation) in the ways that modern 
criminal law would.  And yet, if we consider the constitutional 
text closely, we see that Adherence Treason (as opposed to 
Levying War Treason) bears much resemblance to the law of 
complicity, and particularly the law of accomplice liability.  
This is not to say that one can be an accomplice to treason or 
that treason prosecutions can be based upon a theory of 
derivative liability.  At common law, which applied the law of 
parties – now overwhelmingly abolished in American criminal 
law, but with which the Framers would have been familiar – 
treason was not among the crimes to which the law of parties 
applied.130  Blackstone, in fact, reminds us that all who commit 
treason are principals.131  Of course, that would be functionally 
true under existing federal criminal law as well, as it explicitly 
treats aiders and abettors as principals.132  My point, rather, is 
merely to explain that there is symmetry between the law of 
Adherence Treason and the law of complicity.   
In our criminal law, we understand that when X aids D 
in the commission of a crime, with the purpose of facilitating 
D’s completion of the crime, then X is guilty of the underlying 
crime on the theory of accomplice liability.133  Modern penal 
codes have worked some variation into this model, but the 
model itself prevails throughout American criminal law.134  Of 
                                                 
129 See Fletcher, supra note 14, at 1619. 
130 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, §30.03[A][1], at 460. 
131 See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *35. 
132 See 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012).  
133 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, §13.2, at 708 (“It may generally be said 
that one is liable as an accomplice to the crime of another if he (a) 
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prevent it (b) with the intent thereby to promote or facilitate 
commission of the crime.”). 
134 See id. §13.1(e), at 706-07.   
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course, the mental state required for accomplice liability is a 
subject of considerable debate,135 and I do not purport to 
answer here the many questions that this debate raises.  
Nonetheless, it is fair to conclude that a consistent theme of 
the prevailing legal model is that, to be guilty as an 
accomplice, the one providing aid must provide it with the 
purpose of facilitating or promoting or encouraging the 
commission of the target offense, as well as with the mental 
state required by the target offense.136  These are the so-called 
dual intents of accomplice liability.137   
This is true under existing federal law, as well.  Federal 
accomplice liability is governed by statute, section 2 of Title 18, 
which provides that “[w]hoever commits an offense against 
the United States or aids, abets, counsels, commands, induces, 
or procures its commission, is punishable as a principal.”138  
Although the federal law of accomplice mens rea has been 
uneven, it has been generally agreed that the defendant must 
“intend” that the target crime be committed (though, again, 
there is considerable dispute about what “intent” means in 
this context – whether it requires the purpose that the target 
crime be committed, or simply knowledge that the assistance 
will aid the commission of the target crime).139  In Judge 
Hand’s words, the aider and abettor must have “associated 
himself with the venture, participated in it as in something he 
wished to bring about, and sought by his actions to make it 
succeed.”140  The Supreme Court, in fact, recently reaffirmed 
                                                 
135 Id. §13.2(b), at 712-13.  See also Baruch Weiss, What Were They 
Thinking?: The Mental States of the Aider and Abettor and the Causer 
Under Federal Law, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 1341 (2002) (analyzing 
federal case law); John F. Decker, The Mental State Requirement for 
Accomplice Liability in American Criminal Law, 60 S.C. L. REV. 237 
(2008) (analyzing various state law approaches); Grace Mueller, 
Note, The Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 2169, 
2172 (1988) (discussing various theories). 
136 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, § 30.05, at 469-70. 
137 Id. at 469. 
138 18 U.S.C. § 2(a) (2012). 
139 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, § 13.2(b)-(d), at 712-18. 
140 United States v. Peoni, 100 F.2d 401 (2nd Cir. 1938).  The Peoni 
decision has been subject to question.  See, e.g., Stephen P. Garvey, 
Reading Rosemond, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 233, 239 n.23 (2014); Weiss, 
supra note 135, at 1424.  
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this standard and its kinship to the common law of accomplice 
liability.141  Moreover, even under the law of accomplice 
liability, knowledge does not foreclose a finding of intent.  
Courts can sometimes infer intent from knowledge.142  And to 
complicate matters further, there is authority, in federal 
criminal law as well, for the proposition that accomplice 
liability can be found where the accomplice simply has 
knowledge that her aid will facilitate a crime.143  Again, 
though, the point is not to resolve the debate over mens rea of 
federal accomplice liability.  The point, rather, is that because 
the constitutional text speaks in terms of “aiding” another (the 
enemy), there is a natural relationship between the Treason 
Clause and the law of accomplice liability, the law of aiding 
another.  Understanding Adherence Treason as a species of 
complicity – or at least as a close cousin – may help improve 
our understanding of the Treason Clause and how it functions 
in the modern world of criminal law.   
Both Cramer and Kawakita, in fact, use language that 
only amplifies the sounds of complicity doctrine that 
accompany the Treason Clause.   In Cramer, the Court speaks 
in terms that remind us of the dual intents.144  And although 
Hurst criticized the Cramer Court’s conclusion that the 
                                                 
141 See Rosemond v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1240 (2014).  This is not 
to say that Rosemond definitively answers problems related to the 
mens rea of accomplice liability.  See Garvey, supra note 140, at 238-
50. 
142 A well-known case on this subject (though it appears in the 
conspiracy context) is People v. Lauria, 251 Cal. App. 2d 471 (Cal. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1967), in which the operator of telephone answering 
service permitted participants in a prostitution ring to use his 
service, knowing that the service was used for this purpose.  The 
court explained the circumstances under which intent may be 
inferred from knowledge, id. at 478-81, but that none of those 
circumstances existed in Lauria’s case because he had no special 
interest or stake in the success of the prostitution venture.  Id. at 482-
83. 
143 See, e.g., United States v. Fountain, 768 F.2d 790, modified, 777 F.2d 
345 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. Campisi, 306 F.2d 308 (2nd Cir. 
1962).  See also Weiss, supra note 135, at 1396-1409 (analyzing federal 
case law on knowledge). 
144 Cramer, 325 U.S. at 31. 
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treasonous overt act must actually aid the enemy,145 that 
particular reading of the Treason Clause – whatever the other 
shortcomings of the Cramer opinion – would at least be 
consistent with the common law understanding of aid for 
accomplice liability, which required that the accomplice’s aid 
in fact assist the principal.146  Moreover, in Kawakita, the Court 
explained that Adherence Treason does not require that the 
overt act be one that turns the tide in the enemy’s efforts, or 
even that it be one of great significance to the enemy.147  The 
overt act can be insubstantial and have little or no ultimate 
effect on the war effort against the United States.148  So long as 
the aid that the traitor provides would, at a minimum, 
embolden the enemy in its efforts, the aid is sufficient for 
treason (when joined with the relevant treasonous intent).149  
A parallel principle exists in the law of accomplice liability.  
The aid need not be significant.150  Rather, even trivial 
assistance or even mere psychological encouragement, 
combined with the relevant specific intent, is sufficient for 
guilt on a theory of accomplice liability.151  
The Snowden affair offers an example of how this 
principle functions.  Because of the scope of the information 
that he disclosed, and the likelihood that this information 
reached an American enemy (ISIS, al Qaeda, etc.), it is 
certainly plausible to think that the disclosure aided them.152  
                                                 
145 See HURST, supra note 12, at 210.  See also Crane, supra note 13, at 
654-56 (surveying scholarly criticism of Justice Jackson’s Cramer 
opinion). 
146 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, § 30.04[B][1], at 467. 
147 See Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 738. 
148 Id.  The Court also cited Haupt, saying that “harboring the spy in 
Haupt v. United States . . . was also insignificant in the total war effort 
of Germany during the recent war.  Yet it was a treasonable act.”  Id. 
149 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, § 13.2(a), at 708-09 (describing how 
encouragement may allow guilt on accomplice liability theory). 
150 See United States v. Bennett, 75 F.3d 40, 45 (1st Cir. 1996).   
151 See DRESSLER, supra note 34, § 30.04[B][1], at 467.  The law of trivial 
assistance has come under fire.  See Joshua Dressler, Reforming 
Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance as a Lesser Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. 
CRIM. L. 427 (2008). 
152 See James Gordon Meek, et al., Intel Heads: Edward Snowden Did 
‘Profound Damage’ to U.S. Security, ABC NEWS (Jan. 29, 2014), available 
at http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/intel-heads-edward-snowden-
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Even if the disclosure did not directly result in any American 
casualties, or even have any significant role in an enemy 
attack, the disclosures at least could have emboldened the 
enemy or strengthened the enemy’s fortitude in planning or 
perhaps even executing an attack.  And yet, again, in the 
absence of an intent that the enemy launch a successful attack, 
the aid that the disclosures provided would not be treasonous 
aid and comfort.  The Snowden example, in fact, shows how 
the overlap of treason law with complicity law would resolve 
the knowledge/purpose debate.  That is, even if Snowden was 
aware (had knowledge) that his actions would aid the enemy 
(and this is a fair bet), he still would not be guilty of treason 
because he lacked the specific purpose to betray.   
But think about a different example.  Imagine an 
American citizen who decides to join the cause of, for instance, 
al Qaeda or ISIS.  He or she then communicates information 
digitally – such as via YouTube, Twitter, email, or posted on a 
personal blog – so that the enemy could have easy access to it, 
indeed, with the hope that the enemy would gain access to it 
for purposes of planning an attack or doing some harm to 
America or its security interests.  This could be sensitive 
national security information to which the person has access 
(like the information Snowden disclosed), or it could be other 
information that may benefit those enemy groups in planning 
or executing an attack.  It could even be information pledging 
support for the terrorist cause and a hope for the killing of 
Americans, or the destruction of the United States.  If the 
enemy never sees or receives the communication, then even 
though the citizen intended to betray America, a treason 
prosecution is likely barred.  It offered no aid.  As in the 
common law of accomplice liability, attempted aid is 
insufficient for proving guilt, unless the attempted aid is 
known to the principal actor and thus serves as 
encouragement.153  The overt act must actually offer some aid 
and comfort.   
The Constitution does not mandate significant aid and 
comfort, however.  So if the enemy receives and sees or hears 
                                                                                                       
profound-damage-us-security/story?id=22285388 (describing views 
of James Clapper, Director of National Intelligence,  and John 
Brennan, CIA Director). 
153 See LAFAVE, supra note 50, §13.2(a), at 712. 
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the communication, and even if the information merely 
encourages them or bolsters their fortitude to harm America 
or is otherwise only minimally helpful to their cause, this is 
arguably treasonous (assuming, of course, satisfaction of the 
constitutional proof requirements).154  The same could be said 
of Americans who have taken affirmative steps to not only 
indicate their support for ISIS, but to personally, and more 
directly, assist ISIS.155  Even if those citizens never actually 
reached a destination in which they would fight alongside 
other ISIS cohorts, the key question is whether the steps they 
have taken to join ISIS fighters would encourage ISIS in its 
mission.  These are somewhat closer cases, at least where the 
person has not actually reached the point of actual fighting or 
other direct aid beyond expressions of support or 
encouragement for the terrorists.  Material support for 
terrorism (or conspiracy to provide it, or attempt to provide it) 
offers a clearer legal basis for prosecution,156 and indeed, that 
has been the charge of choice for federal prosecutors in those 
cases.157  But many of the acts that constitute material support 
                                                 
154 See Kawakita, 343 U.S. at 738.  See also Bollman,  8 U.S. (4 Cranch) at 
126 (“[i]f war actually be levied, . . . all those who perform any part, 
however minute, or however remote from the scene of action, and 
who are actually leagued in the general conspiracy, are to be 
considered as traitors.”). 
155 See, e.g., More young Americans arrested for joining ISIS, AOL (Mar. 
4, 2015, 11:10 PM), http://www.aol.com/article/2015/03/04/more-
young-americans-arrested-for-joining-isis/21149844/ (noting 
comments by James Clapper that about 180 Americans have traveled 
to Syria to fight alongside ISIS); Elizabeth Whitman, Americans 
Joining ISIS: Arrests Suggest Young Muslims Lured by Social Media, 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TIMES (Feb. 25, 2015, 3:22 PM), 
http://www.ibtimes.com/americans-joining-isis-arrests-suggest-
young-muslims-lured-social-media-1828286 (noting various citizens 
or American residents who have tried to join ISIS); How many 
Americans have joined ISIS?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 22, 2014, 2:09 PM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/how-many-americans-have-
joined-isis/. 
156 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A, 2339B (2012). 
157 See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Philadelphia Woman 
Arrested for Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL (Apr. 3, 
2015); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Madison, Wisconsin Man 
Charged with Attempting to Provide Material Support to ISIL (Apr. 
9, 2015); Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Fourth Brooklyn, New 
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would also likely constitute “aid and comfort” for purposes of 
Adherence Treason.158  So prosecutors should not rule out the 
possibility of treason, based on the complicity theory 
articulated here.159  Notice, though, how these scenarios differ 
significantly from the Snowden affair – they, unlike the 
Snowden affair, couple assistance (and an intent to render the 
assistance) with an intent to betray. 
Though the parallels are there, the Court – in its few 
treason cases – has not discussed the law of Adherence 
Treason in these accomplice liability terms.  And the parallels 
are admittedly imperfect, chiefly because we do not prosecute 
Adherence Treason on a theory of complicity.  Accomplice 
liability is derivative, and treason liability is always direct.  
Adherence, with the provision of aid and comfort, is the crime.   
Nonetheless, we see that there are important parallels between 
Adherence Treason and complicity law – especially the law of 
accomplice liability, an older version of which the Framers 
would have known – that may explain the outcomes in both 
Cramer and Kawakita and help us better approach future 
problems involving the nature of one’s aid to the enemy and 
the mental state that must accompany that aid.  This is 
especially true at time when, thanks to digital technology 
accessible anywhere in the world, aiding or encouraging the 
enemy can be easy, instantaneous, and potentially quite 
harmful to American institutions and interests. 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
Whatever else Edward Snowden is guilty of, he is most 
likely not guilty of treason.  That does not mean that we, and 
our political leaders with us, should not condemn his conduct.  
Rather, it simply means that we should endeavor to be more 
accurate in our use of treason as serious political rhetoric and 
more conscientious about developing a complete – or, as 
                                                                                                       
York Resident Charged with Attempt and Conspiracy to Provide 
Material Support to ISIL (Apr. 6, 2015). 
158 See 18 U.S.C. §2339A(b) (2012) (broadly defining “material 
support”).   
159 Cf. Eichensehr, supra note 10, at 1503-05 (arguing that, in 
balancing advantages and disadvantages of treason prosecutions for 
assisting non-state actors, often the benefits will outweigh the risks). 
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complete as can be expected, given the complexity and nature 
of it – understanding of American treason law.  American 
treason is supposed to be hard to prove, hard to prosecute, 
and hard to punish.  Yet where it exists, as the Constitution 
defines it, federal prosecutors should be more ready to enforce 
it and to seek severe punishment for it.  Modern technology 
and social media, and the demonstrated willingness of some 
Americans to join forces with modern terrorists, could make 
treason prosecutions more plausible than they have been in 
American history.  As the Snowden affair reveals, however, 
treason against the United States requires that only with the 
confluence of a sufficiently guilty act and guilty mind devoted 
to betraying America will a treason prosecution represent a 
constitutionally acceptable legal response to conduct that 
harms American national security and the institutions of 
American government.   Merely doing harm to American 
interests may be criminal, but it is not necessarily treasonous.  
This might make us inclined to broaden American treason, for 
broadening treason law might make it easier for us to allege 
and prove treason with respect to Americans who do harm to 
American institutions and interests by aiding our enemies.  
And it might make us feel better about having a criminal law 
that comports with our rhetorical and psychological 
sensibilities about disloyalty.  But doing so would be 
inconsistent with the narrow and limited version of treason 
that the founding generation – which well understood the 
politics and consequences of disloyalty – not only desired, but 
provided in the constitutional text.  Weakening the limits on 
American treason could undermine the delicate balance that 
the Constitution has struck to ensure sober use of the federal 
power to punish treachery against the Nation. 
